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HALKON telemetry ingest & retention
all systems accepting | page refreshed — | server time — | epoch —

Status

All six ingest points are accepting

Component state, current throughput and the full incident log. Values marked as live are computed in your browser from the current clock; incident records and dates are fixed.

—M ev/s accepted now Against a combined ceiling of 4.75 M ev/s.
— agents connected Streams currently open across all regions.
—ms ack p99, 5 min Target is under 200 ms; the 90-day figure is 138 ms.
99.973% accept success, 90 d Batches acknowledged over batches offered, all regions.

Components

eu-north-1 · ingest accepting —k ev/s · 99.99% 90 d
eu-central-1 · ingest accepting —k ev/s · 99.98% 90 d
eu-west-1 · ingest accepting —k ev/s · 99.99% 90 d
na-east-1 · ingest accepting —k ev/s · 99.96% 90 d
ap-southeast-1 · ingest accepting —k ev/s · 99.98% 90 d
sa-east-1 · ingest accepting —k ev/s · 99.95% 90 d
query service · all regions nominal — in flight · lag — s
rule evaluation · all regions on schedule last cycle —
notification delivery nominal 0 parked in the last hour
console and management API nominal p95 210 ms
agent update channel idle 4.2.1 · published 2026-09-08

Availability is measured as accepted batches over offered batches per region, excluding anything refused for a client-side reason (4xx). Definition and the contractual figure: service levels.

Accepted rate, last 24 hours

2.0 1.0 0 1.72 00Z 06Z 12Z 18Z 23Z million accepted events per second, hourly mean, all six regions
Fig. 13 — The instantaneous figure at the top of this page follows this profile. Current value: — events per second, —.

Last 90 days

One bar per day. Olive is a clean day, amber is degraded service somewhere, red is an interval during which at least one region refused traffic it should have accepted.

90 days ago 45 days ago today · —
Trailing 90 days ending —. Contractual target is 99.9% per region and per month.
Region Accept success Ack p99 Unavailable Incidents
eu-north-199.99%121 ms41 min1
eu-central-199.98%134 ms0 min0
eu-west-199.99%118 ms0 min0
na-east-199.96%156 ms0 min1
ap-southeast-199.98%149 ms0 min0
sa-east-199.95%174 ms0 min1
all regions99.973%138 ms41 min3

“Unavailable” counts only intervals during which correctly formed batches were refused. Degraded query latency with ingest intact is recorded as an incident but not as unavailability.

Scheduled maintenance

WindowRegionExpected effectStarts
2026-10-05 01:00–03:00 UTC sa-east-1 Storage node replacement. Writes continue; query latency may rise for a few minutes at a time. —
2026-10-19 02:00–04:00 UTC na-east-1 Ingest fleet rollout. Agents will see one graceful GOAWAY each and reconnect within their jitter window. —
2026-11-09 01:00–02:00 UTC all regions Certificate rotation. No connection drop expected; clients pinning an old CA will fail and must be corrected first. —

Windows are announced at least 14 days ahead and are cancelled rather than extended if they overrun. A maintenance window is never a licence to refuse data — if ingest is affected, it is an incident.

Open advisories

IdAffectsDescriptionAction
ADV-2026-04 hkagent 4.0.0 – 4.1.3 Under sustained spill the zstd arena grows past memory_limit_mb by up to 40 MiB. Only reached during outages longer than two hours. upgrade to 4.1.4+
ADV-2026-05 syslog clients pinning TLS 1.2 TLS 1.2 acceptance on port 6514 ends 2026-12-01. Affected senders are visible in your own hk_ingest_tls_version metric. move to TLS 1.3
ADV-2026-06 HKQL v2 syntax Rewriting of v2 queries ends 2027-05-19. Saved queries still on v2 are flagged in the console with the v3 equivalent shown. migrate saved queries

Advisories are removed once the affected versions fall out of support or the deadline passes. Agent support policy: 18 months per release.

Incident log

Every incident that refused data or degraded query service, with what happened and what changed afterwards. Nothing is removed from this list.

partial outage 2026-08-19 13:42–14:23 UTC 41 min eu-north-1 —

Ingest backpressure at the platform peak

At 13:42 UTC the eu-north-1 ingest fleet crossed its shed threshold while the platform was at its all-time peak of 3.10 M events/s. Shedding proceeded in the documented order and reached the info class, which meant correctly formed INFO-severity batches were refused with 503 for 41 minutes.

Cause: a single account raised its own send rate roughly ninefold inside twenty minutes after enabling debug logging across a large fleet, and the regional ceiling had 30% headroom rather than the 40% our own policy requires. The burst allowance absorbed the first ten minutes; after that the shed logic did what it is designed to do.

Agents buffered as designed and drained within 18 minutes of recovery. Measured data loss: zero for accounts with a non-full disk buffer; four accounts with buffers under 128 MiB and high event rates lost between 40 seconds and 6 minutes of INFO-severity logs.

Changed since: eu-north-1 ceiling raised from 900 000 to 1 200 000 ev/s on 2026-08-26. Per-account rate-of-change detection now warns the account and us when accepted volume rises more than 4× inside an hour. The capacity policy is now enforced as an alert rather than a review item.

degraded 2026-09-02 08:11–09:04 UTC 53 min na-east-1 —

Query latency after a block-index rebuild

A routine index rebuild on na-east-1 ran with the wrong concurrency setting and competed with interactive queries for disk bandwidth. Query p95 rose from 0.9 s to 11 s. Ingest was unaffected throughout and no batch was refused.

Alert rules whose queries exceeded their evaluation interval entered the error state and notified, which is correct behaviour and was the first signal we acted on.

Changed since: rebuild concurrency is now derived from measured idle bandwidth instead of a fixed constant, and rebuilds yield to interactive queries rather than sharing fairly with them.

degraded 2026-07-22 19:38–20:26 UTC 48 min sa-east-1 —

Notification delivery backlog

An outbound path from sa-east-1 degraded and webhook deliveries began timing out at 10 s. Three delivery attempts per notification meant the queue grew faster than it drained; 1 184 notifications were parked, and every one of them was surfaced in its rule’s history and re-delivered manually after recovery.

Ingest, storage and query were unaffected. Alerts continued to evaluate and record correctly — only delivery was affected, which is the distinction the incident classification is built around.

Changed since: delivery workers are now per-channel rather than per-region, so one slow destination cannot occupy the pool. The built-in notification_delivery_failed rule was given a zero for duration so the first parked notification notifies immediately.

degraded 2026-06-03 11:20–13:32 UTC 2 h 12 min na-east-1 —

Query timeouts on wide scans

A change to the block pruner produced a plan that read every block in the time range instead of the ones matching the attribute predicate. Queries over more than roughly 200 GB hit the 60 s interactive timeout. Narrow queries, dashboards and all ingest were unaffected.

Changed since: the planner’s estimated block count is now compared against the actual count after every query, and a divergence above 20% fails the release gate.

partial outage 2026-02-11 03:04–03:22 UTC 18 min sa-east-1 —

Storage node replacement refused writes

During a planned node replacement the replacement node joined before its volume was fully attached. Batches requiring two-of-three durable copies could not be acknowledged and returned 503 for 18 minutes. Agents buffered; nothing was lost.

Changed since: a node is not admitted to the write quorum until it has served a synthetic read at full block size. The check adds about 90 seconds to every replacement.

partial outage 2025-11-30 22:10–22:36 UTC 26 min all regions —

Certificate rotation broke older syslog senders

A scheduled certificate rotation changed the issuing chain. Syslog clients validating against a pinned intermediate rather than the root failed TLS on port 6514 for 26 minutes until the previous chain was restored. OTLP, remote write and HTTP ingest were unaffected because those clients validate against the root.

Changed since: rotations now publish the new chain 30 days ahead and serve both for a 14-day overlap. The syslog listener logs, per sender, which chain was used to validate — visible in your own account as hk_ingest_tls_chain.

Incidents before 2025-11-30 are available on request and are included in the quarterly service report sent to Regional accounts.